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ABSTRACT 
We present a network coding security method capable of detecting several routing attacks in wireless reconfigurable 
networks. Routing security attacks include selective forwarding, black holes, and wormholes. The proposed method 
performs linear network coding over intermediate nodes composing a given route, not only to distribute content, but 
also to provide data confidentiality by cooperation as a mechanism of detection. The method presents a robust, 
accurate and fast response under security attacks for varying network conditions, such as interference and outage 
due to channel fading. It also provides a gain in network throughput by increasing the number of successfully received 
packets without a significant increase of the bandwidth usage. 
 
Keywords: Network coding, sinkholes, selective forwarding, Frechet, outage. 
 
 
RESUMEN 
Presentamos un método basado en codificación de red capaz de detectar ataques de seguridad a la información de 
ruteo en redes inalámbricas reconfigurables. Los ataques de seguridad a la información de ruteo incluyen ataques 
como el envío selectivo de datos, agujeros negros y gusanos. El método propuesto realiza una codificación de red 
lineal en los nodos intermedios de una ruta determinada, para distribuir datos y para proveer confidencialidad por 
medio de un mecanismo cooperativo de detección. El método presenta una respuesta robusta,  rápida y precisa ante 
ataques de seguridad bajo condiciones de red variables, tales como interferencia y pérdida de comunicación debido 
al desvanecimiento del canal. También incrementa los datos que llegan al destino sin incrementar significativamente 
el uso del ancho de banda. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Wireless Reconfigurable Networks (WRN) are 
characterized by their capability to rapidly 
change their topology in order to adapt to 
current network needs without the use of 
infrastructure. In WRN, security becomes a 
requirement where data integrity and 
confidentiality must be protected from a variety 
of attacks. Current security schemes are based 
on cryptography, providing a partial and 
expensive (high processing) defense since they 
usually rely on a central unit, which results 
inconvenient for mobile networks. We propose 
a Detection and Defense Method (DDM) that 
provides an innovative and inexpensive 
processing alternative that uses network coding  
 
 
not only to collaborate in packet distribution,but  
also as a tool for monitoring and detecting 
several attacks. 
 
The DDM is based on random network coding, [1]. 
Routing with network coding, involves cooperative 
processing from the nodes in the route. The DDM 
solves attacks such as the Sinkhole where an 
intruder attracts network traffic by advertising itself 
as having a better path from a source to a 
destination. Also, Selective forwarding where once 
an adversary creates a sinkhole, it refuses to 
forward a selection to the destination. 
 
The DDM is evaluated throughout simulations 
under realistic network conditions such as Frechet  
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interference and outage due to Rayleigh channel 
fading. These are important issues since they limit 
network capacity and grade of service. From the 
point of view of data integrity, errors can be caused 
by interference instead of security attacks. On the 
other hand, the DDM is based on the existence of a 
set of routes considered trustable; therefore, it is 
important to make an estimation of how reliable such 
routes are based on an outage probability analysis. 
 
2. Related work 
 
There are several mechanisms proposed which 
attempt to solve routing security problems. 
Recently, [2] presented a central processing 
algorithm to detect an intruder in a sinkhole attack. 
This algorithm finds a list of suspected nodes and 
carries out a network flow graph identifying a sink 
attack by observing data missing from an attacked 
area. They perform evaluations in a free 
interference or fading network. In a different setting, 
[3] presents a scheme that uses node collaboration 
and data redundancy to solve attacks associated 
with data authenticity and availability. They assume 
that at least one node can recognize a single event 
and broadcast it to multiple nodes. They use 
network coding for generating random linear 
combinations of the packets they receive. In [4], 
authors consider a random network coding scheme 
where source nodes include in each source packet 
hash symbols calculated as polynomial functions of 
the source data. Receiver nodes check the data and 
hash values of their decoded packets to determine if 
data has been modified. Simulations under realistic 
networks are not provided. We present in [6] and 
[7], the formulation of the DDM in WRN. In [6], an 
analysis of the method under a heuristic measure of 
interference is presented. In [6], the DDM detects an 
attack taking into consideration that data 
modification can also be caused by an interference 
factor in the route. The interference factor is 
obtained by the relation of the maximal interference 
of a node in the route to the maximal interference of 
a node in the network. Interference measure is 
based on the number of nodes in an interference 
area defined by a disk of a given radius. Also in [6], 
an analysis of the threshold packets for attack 
recognition is commanded.  In [7], we introduce an 
interference analysis based on the Nearest 
Neighboring Node, [5], and an outage probability 
analysis, and evaluate the DDM under a basic 
scenario.  In [8], network coding is used to increase 
multicast capacity in a mechanism based on an 
encryption key and a checksum to provide 
confidentiality and integrity in a network. The 
authors do not use network coding as a tool in order 
to provide security; they propose a mechanism 
suitable for network coding environments. The 
proposed mechanism encrypts data packets and 
use linear operations for checksum. Simulations for 
attack probabilities (.05 to .4) are provided where 
the number of successfully received packets is 
analyzed. It will be shown that the mechanism 
proposed in this paper presents a better 
performance (about 60% for attack probability of 
0.4) for higher attack probabilities than that in [8] 
(about 20% for attack probability of 0.4).  
 
In this paper, we introduce different network 
parameters that provide us a different viewpoint of 
the DDM, showing tradeoffs between node density 
and interference. We also evaluate the tradeoff 
between transmission range and outage probability. 
At the same time, we discuss how the DDM 
provides a robust behavior for node mobility and an 
adversary with dynamic capabilities. 
 
3. Model description 
 
Consider a WRN where a set of nodes are randomly 
placed in an operational area A. Each node is 
allowed to command network coding. We assume 
that trustable routes [6] are already available. Figure 
1 shows the scenario where we have a trustable 
route in operation Rt: s, 1, 2, 3, 4, d, from source s to 
destination  d and another node announces a new 
route as a better option, i.e., Rnew: s, 1, 5, 4, d. This 
node 5 might be an intruder that is able to monitor 
trustable routes in order to command a sinkhole or 
selective forwarding attack announcing itself as a 
better route than the existing one. If we assume 
unitary costs in every link (Figure 1), the trustable 
route has a higher cost than that of the new route. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Network topology: typical change.  
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3.1 Network Coding 
 
Consider the network as a directed acyclic graph 
G. The packets under transmission in the network 
are seen as a set of discrete independent random 
processes X1, . . . , Xr. The packets are observable 
at one or more source nodes m≥1, and there are d 
≥ 1 receiver nodes. The random process carried by 
edge ej,k that starts in node j (i.e. j=1 in Figure 1) 
and ends at node k (i.e. k=2 in Figure 1) is denoted 
Yj. We assume that information is transmitted in 
packets with constant length l. In a linear code, Yj 
is a linear combination of incoming information 
flows this is 
 ,     
j I k k k s s s j Y X Y    [1],
  where information is coded by a random linear 
coding coefficient given by βk for node k. Note that 
β={β1,  β2,..,} is the set of local encoding 
coefficients whose values can be strings taken 
from the set  1  . Therefore, an information flow 
from source Xs coded by s, can be expressed as 
sXs, therefore, if the flow is coded by another 
node j with code j,  the resulting flow will be jsXs.  
 
Let us assume that the initialization phase where 
trustable routes are discovered and stored in a 
database can be performed, [6]. After this phase, 
and due to mobility of nodes, some routes may 
change and scenarios such as that presented in 
Figure 1 may be present over the network. 
 
When some trustable node k detects a second route 
with lower cost, see node 1 in Figure 1, then this 
node k sends the packet information from s to d over 
the two routes in order to enable the DDM. Note that 
if the trusted route cannot be maintained due to 
issues such as mobility or interference, then the 
nodes can find another trusted route from s to d 
according to the current network conditions. This can 
be done as long as a trusted route can be found. 
 
3.2 Detection and Defense Method (DDM) 
 
We analyze the problem when a change is caused 
by an existing node in the network that announces 
a new route as an alternative to a one already 
trustable route. Once the compromised node 
achieves the change of route, it can command a 
sinkhole and a selective forwarding attack. When 
network coding is allowed, we assume that 
intermediate nodes do not introduce extra data. 
Figure 1 shows the random network coding 
information flow in a classic topology. As stated 
before, node 1 detects that it has to send the coded 
information over two routes, thus starting the DDM, 
and sends to node 2 an alarm message which 
propagates to the rest of the nodes in the trustable 
route. 
 
First, let us divide the operation of the DDM in 
iterations  ik, [7], as shown in Figure 2. Second, 
there is an operation related to every ik (Figure 3). 
Also, we suppose that two nodes can be 
transmitting in the same iteration without causing 
interference to each other. The performance 
measures are the following;  For Figure 2 and 
Figure 3, the DDM works as follows. In Figure 3 a), 
we can observe that from i1 to i3, X1 is generated by 
source  S, transmitted and received by node n1, 
where it is also coded.  In Figure 3 b), actions 
performed from i4 to i9  are explained, several 
actions take place at the same time because 
information packets are sent through both, the 
trustable and the suspicious route. Node 4 
receives Y3 and Y5, and requests to the suspicious 
node 5 its coding coefficient β5. Thus, node 5 
sends its coding coefficient, assume that this is
'
5  . 
Then node 4 processes the detection packet 
5 5 3 4 '  Y Y W  , where  X s Y 3 2 1 3      and 
X Y s 5 1 5     .  Therefore, 
' ) ( 5 5 3 2 4      W , if 
'
5 5    , then  1 5 5 
'     and   . 3 2 4    W In Figure 3 
c), we can observe that W4 is sent to node 3, which 
processes    , 2 3 3 2 3 4 3         W W   and sends it 
back to node 2, producing W2= W3  β2= (β2)β2= 1. 
Following this formulation, we can see that if  5 '   
is the original coding coefficient used by node 5, 
then, node 2 verifies that W2=1 validating the new 
route; otherwise node 2 obtains that  W2≠1 
disabling the new route and classifying node 5 as 
an intruder node. Furthermore, packet 
transmission continues over the trustable route. In 
this approach, we can see  k b' as the public key of 
node  k that can be known by any node in the 
network.  In Figure 2, we show in detail all the 
iterations performed in a communication session 
commanding the DDM, where three different 
processes are commanded in parallel. The first 
one, when information is sent from s to d 
throughout the new route (Figure 2c). The second   
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one throughout the trusted route while the DDM is 
being executed (see Figures 2a and 2b). The third 
one and final one is the sending of  5 '   by node 5 
in order to complete the DDM (Figure 2d).  
 
3.2.1. Packet Overhead 
 
In order to validate an attack throughout the new 
route, the DDM keeps working on the trustable 
route until the attack is detected, if no attack is 
detected, then the DDM will be operating until a 
threshold   is achieved. For the general case, the 
packet overhead is given by ρX= 2l1,j – 1, where l1,j  
is the length from node 1 to node j  (i.e.  j=3 in 
Figure 2) [6]. The packet overhead ρX  can be seen 
as the cost imposed by the DDM to the network.  
 
3.3 DDM Performance 
 
In this section, two important parameters used to 
evaluate the DDM performance are presented.   
 
3.3.1. Successfully Received Packets 
 
The number of packets received successfully is 
affected by the time that the DDM takes to validate 
an attack because in such time iterations 
packets are being sent over the route to be 
validated (new route). Let us define X1j as the 
packet generated by the source at iteration ij. 
For the network, in Figure 2, the DDM is able 
to detect an attack up to iteration i15. The 
packets exposed to the attack from node 5 are 
those produced by s from i1 to i13 because 
packets X114 and X115 have not reached 
node 5 at i15, therefore, these packets can be 
redirected if necessary. The procedure 
illustrated in Figure 2 can be extended to the 
general attack case given in Figure 1. As 
stated in [6] the number of packets exposed to 
attack is given by ∆X=2[ ls,j+( lj,1-1)], where 
ls,j   and lj,1 are the length in hops of the 
forward route from s to j, and the backward 
route from j to node 1, respectively, in Figure 
1, node j is node 1. ∆X denotes the number of 
packets that are sent through the new route 
while the DDM verifies if the new route is a 
good or a bad route; therefore, if it is a bad 
route, then ∆X packets may be lost or modified 
by the attacker while the DDM disables the 
new route. ∆X indicates how efficiently the 
DDM can detect an attack from the new route. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Iteration consumption for attack validation. 
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Figure 3. Operations realized in each iteration by the DDM. 
 
a) 
b) 
c)  
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3.3 Network Impairments 
 
In WRN, several impairment factors degrade 
transmissions causing packet loss. Now, we extend 
the environments where interference can cause 
packet loss. Also we consider outage probability of 
the trusted route (probability of unreliable route). 
 
3.4.1. Frechet Interference 
 
We present the Nearest Neighboring Node (NNN) 
interference analysis since it is the node with the 
most influence. The NNN interference of a WRN 
can be characterized by its cumulative distribution 
function (cdf) and its probability density function 
(pdf). The pdf of the NNN interference is given by 
a Frechet distribution, [5], considering a 2-D 
region. Assume that every node uses a constant 
transmission power, PT, which is determined by 
the amount of dBm’s that must be received at a 
distance  rmax  by a node in order to maintain 
communication. Thus, the maximum coverage 
region that a node has must be of rmax meters, 
distance at which its signal must be received at a 
power PR [5], With PT=PRr
γ
max, (γ is the path loss)
 
assuming that the NNN transmitting at the same 
time is located at an exponentially distributed 
distance D from the reference node,  interference 
If  experienced is characterized by 
 
   
2
T P
If e F
  , where λ is the node density, 
of a Poisson spatial process. The pdf is given by  
  
   
 
 
2 1 2
2 T T
T
P P
P If e f
 
 . It can be seen 
that    If F  and       If f  correspond to the cdf and 
the pdf, respectively, of a random variable with 
Frechet distribution, [5]; therefore interference 
caused by the NNN transmitting at PT is a stable 
Frechet pdf with shape parameter ζ=  2 , and 
scale parameter σ=
2    and variable x=.  
 
Therefore, DDM has to identify if a packet has 
been modified or lost due an attack or due to 
interference. We follow the same procedure as that 
in [6] but define differently pI, the probability that a 
packet will not be correctly received at the 
destination due to interference. Based on the NNN 
interference analysis, we set pI as  ) (   f I , which 
is known, if we know the distance of the nearest 
neighboring node to any node in the path of the 
trustable route (Figure1). We establish that if Pr
) (   f I  is above the threshold probability pt, then 
the packet is not correctly received due to 
interference. As a first approach, we select pt 
randomly in order to simulate heterogeneous 
quality of service conditions for nodes in the 
network. Let us define pa  as the probability of 
routing security attack. The error probability pe, is 
the probability that the packet will not be received 
correctly for any reason and is defined as 
   . a I a I a I e p p p p p p p      1 1        
 
3.4.2. Outage Probability. 
 
An outage evaluation based on fading channel 
state and source-destination distance as 
proposed in [9] is commanded. Assuming rich 
scattering where the Rayleigh fading model and 
node distribution according to a Poisson process 
are allowed, we can use the outage model 
proposed in [9]. We use Rayleigh instead of 
Ricean fading because in ad-hoc scenarios, 
nodes transmit in an omnidirectional way, 
therefore transmissions find several objects on 
which they can bounce including other nodes’ 
devices. This situation implies that node-to-node 
communication will not necessarily be on a 
100% line-of-sight path and will be accompanied 
by multipath components. Thus, Rayleigh fading 
is included in the simulations, which is also for 
slow fading channels, this is, channels with 
changes faster than a packet transmission time 
but slower than the symbol duration. 
 
Let us assume that every node is able to use a 
constant transmission power, PT. Let d  be the 
distance between transmitter and receiver and dn 
be the distance d to the n-th nearest neighbor in a 
sector .  Also  (SNR)Tx can be defined as PT/N , 
where  N is the power of noise. The outage 
probability is defined as follows when the received 
SNR is less than the defined threshold ε in a given 
condition of distance D. The outage probability is 
given by  
n
n
Tx
o B
SNR
  






  1
2
2
1
 

P , 
where n is the number of hops in the route [9]. In a 
relay system, an outage occurs if either one of the 
links is in outage. The outage probability for a relay 
routing which has n-1 hops from source to 
destination is given by  
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  
1
1 1 1 1 1 1

       
n
out n n out n out n B P P P , , ,
where Pij  ,out  is the outage probability that the 
message is transmitted unsuccessfully from 
node i to node j .  
 
Based on this formulation, we are able to 
evaluate if a trusted route is reliable in order to 
command the DDM. If Pn,out is below to a outage 
probability threshold po then the actual trusted 
route is considered unreliable and another 
trusted route is found. 
 
3.4.3. Attack Detection Rule.  
 
Two measures are taken by the DDM in an attack 
detection process. First, the DDM will modify the 
threshold     to recognize if the attack has been 
performed. This threshold is given by   , X I p C   
where C is a proportionality constant and  is the 
ceiling function. Second, we establish a detection 
rule. Throughout simulations, we obtained that 
80% of the threshold    needs to be received 
correctly in order to declare that no attack has 
been commanded. If the DDM declares that no 
attack has been commanded, the new route is 
used and the DDM activates a monitoring process 
with probability p m. This monitoring process 
commands the DDM over a trustable route 
available. The monitoring probability pm is given by 
the ratio of the incorrectly received packets and the 
total packets received in the last 20% of    .  In 
Table 1, the definition of all the parameters of the 
model is provided. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Parameter Definition 
ρX  Packet overhead 
∆X  Number of packets exposed to a security attack 
rmax  Maximum transmission range 
PR  Received power 
PT  Transmitting power 
   Path loss 
If  Interference experienced by a node 
   Number of nodes 
   Node density 
pI  Probability that a packet will not be received correctly due to 
interference 
pt  Interference probability threshold 
pe  Error probability 
pa  Security attack probability 
Pij ,out  Outage probability. Probability that the message is transmitted 
unsuccessfully from the node i to the node j. 
po  Outage probability threshold 
Α  Attack recognition threshold 
C  Proportionality constant 
pm  Attack monitoring probability 
A  Network area 

x T SNR) (   Signal to noise ratio compared to a threshold   in dB 
  Sector of the coverage region in radians 
Table 1. List of Model Parameters. 
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4. Results 
 
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the 
DDM under NNN interference and outage 
probability given by a Rayleigh fading channel. Our 
simulations have the base environment of a network 
scenario with μ nodes which are uniformly 
distributed in a square area of A=10,000m
2. We 
suppose a homogeneous transmission range rmax=r. 
Also, the path exponent γ=2 and the node density 
λ= μ/A. PR=100dBm for the interference calculations 
as done in [5]. For the outage probability, we set 
=π/2, and  
x T SNR) ( =26dB, as in [9].  
 
We select randomly source and destination nodes 
and find the shortest route (trusted route) between 
them if it exists, then the adversary is introduced 
with the new route. When both routes exist, the 
outage probability analysis is performed. If one of 
the two involved routes is not reliable (Pn,out <po) 
then another route is found. Every time a new 
route is found node mobility is introduced. Then, 
we proceed to calculate the interference of the 
given route pI as explained before. We evaluate 
the DDM for this scenario under different attack 
probabilities pa and different transmission ranges r.  
The metrics used for evaluation are the following. 
Packet Overhead (PO) is defined as the ratio of 
the total communication overhead in the network 
commanding the DDM to a network that does not. 
Successfully received packets (SRP) are defined 
as the ratio of the number of packets sent by 
source s to the number of packets received by the 
destination  d, without retransmission. Detection 
Rate (DR) is the ratio of the number of authentic 
attacks detected by the DDM to the number of 
authentic attacks commanded by an adversary. 
False Positive Rate (FPR) is defined as the ratio of 
the number of false declared attacks to the total 
detected attacks. False Negative Rate (FNR) is a 
measure defined as the ratio of real attacks 
undetected to the total detected attacks. No 
Applicability Rate (NAR) is defined as the ratio of 
the number of times that the DDM is no longer 
applicable due to the lack of a trusted or a new 
reliable route to the number of times that a reliable 
route is found. 
 
In [7], a cost-gain analysis of the DDM was 
presented by analyzing the PO and the %SRP 
given by the DDM by plotting pa against these 
parameters in a network where interference and 
outage were not considered. It was shown that the 
PO caused by the DDM can be and the %SRP 
obtained with the DDM can be improved as C is 
decreased. However, the accuracy of the DDM 
given by the %DR and %FPR are worse as C is 
decreased. In this paper we set C=2 in order to 
obtain the improvement in the PO and the %SRP 
without scarifying the %DR and the %FPR. Also in 
[7], a basic evaluation of the DDM under NNN 
interference and Rayleigh outage was done for a 
network of 100 nodes observing that the %SRP 
was increased from 10% without the DDM to more 
than 70% with the DDM . 
 
In the following scenarios, we introduce an 
adversary with dynamic attack capabilities, by 
introducing a maximal attack probability 
max a p , i.e., 
the adversary can chose a different attack 
probability in the range 
max a a p p   0 . We 
present a node density and transmission range 
analysis for the DDM under NNN interference and 
outage relaying routing.  
 
In Figure 4a, we consider a network with μ=50 and 
vary r from 20m to 35m and we observe that we can 
improve the %SRP if r is increased. It can be seen, 
however, that for some pa 25m is sufficient. In 
Figure 4b, a large network with μ=300 is presented 
and  r is modified from 5m to 25m and we also 
obtain a %SRP improvement if r is increased, but 
only for ranges below 25m. This can be explained 
because when r is increased, the interference in the 
network is also increased, therefore, there is a 
tradeoff between the %SRP improvement and the 
NNN interference. We can also see that the best 
performance is attained for μ=300. 
 
In Figure 5a, we consider μ=50 nodes and 
command the range analysis for the PO, with 
Figure 5b (μ=300), we complete the node 
analysis for the PO given by the method. In both 
analyses, we observe that we can achieve an 
improvement on the PO by increasing r until a 
threshold is exceeded and the NNN interference 
grows sufficiently to degrade the PO. A natural 
explanation for this result may be that using a 
large  r, the routes obtained may be shorter 
which naturally decreases the number of packets 
sent in the system. However, this improvement 
can no longer be maintained when r is large  
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enough to cause high NNN interference which 
may degrade the system performance. Also, it 
can be observed that increasing the number of 
nodes helps decrease the PO, which is a 
desired result.  
 
In Figure 6a, we set μ=50 and evaluate for r=20m 
to  r=35m. We can observe that the detection 
capability of the method is not substantially 
modified as we increase r. On the other hand, in 
Figure 6b, we set μ=300 and observe results for r 
from 5m to 25m and we can observe a consistent 
improvement of the %DR for
max a p ≤0.6 that is 
achieved by decreasing r. However, such 
improvement cannot be maintained for large 
ranges like 20m and 25m. This can be explained 
as follows. Using a short r relies on large routes, 
which may imply an increment on ∆X. Large 
routes also imply large outage probability. 
Therefore, we also have a tradeoff between range 
decrease and outage probability.  On this basis, 
we corroborate that by increasing the node 
density, the DDM detection capability is not 
sacrificed ( r=20m). 
 
In Figure 7a and Figure 7b, we make a range 
analysis of the %FPR for a network with μ=50 and 
μ=300 respectively. In Figure 7, we can observe that 
by decreasing r we can improve the %FPR, this 
result can be seen clearly for 
max a p =0.2.  This result 
is explained by the same arguments as those used 
for results in Figure 6. We can also observe that by 
increasing μ from 50 to 300, the positive false alarms 
given by the method does not change substantially.  
 
In Figure 8a, we can see that as r is decreased we 
can obtain a decrement on the %NAR which implies 
an increment on the probability of finding a suitable 
route to command the DDM. In Figure 8b, we 
consider a network with μ=300 and we observe a 
similar behavior with μ=50 from r=10m to 25m; i.e., 
as we increase r we obtain a decrement on the 
%NAR. However, there is a point in which it is not 
possible to keep improving the %NAR as we 
decrease the range. This is explained due to the 
outage probability, as we decrease r we increase the 
route length, and therefore, the outage probability. 
Thus, there is a tradeoff between range decrease 
and outage probability.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                           
 
 
a)  b) 
Figure 4. a) %SRP vs. 
max a p , μ=50. b) %SRP vs. 
max a p , μ=300.  
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a)  b) 
Figure 5. a) PO vs. 
max a p , μ=50. b) PO vs. 
max a p , μ=300. 
 
                            
Figure 6. a) %DR vs.
max a p , μ=50. b) %DR vs.
max a p , μ=300. 
 
a) b) 
                                       
b)  a) 
Figure 7. a) %FPR vs.
max a p , μ=50. b) %FPR vs.
max a p , μ=300. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
We have presented a distributed and effective 
method for detection and defense mechanism 
from sinkhole and selective forwarding attacks 
in WRN that present channel interference and 
channel fading. The DDM assumes a basic 
knowledge of the network topology, the 
availability of a trusted route, and the capability 
of every node in the route to command linear 
network coding over the information. We also 
formulate an NNN interference analysis and an 
evaluation of the outage relaying route of a 
network that performs the DDM. We present a 
realistic interference and outage analysis 
under mobility conditions of the DDM for 
dynamic capabilities of the network adversary. 
The DDM is evaluated under different node 
densities and transmission ranges. The main 
difference between this work and those 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
presented in [6], [7] and [8] is that in this paper 
we present an exhaustive analysis of the 
method under more diverse scenarios where 
the impact of the number of nodes and the 
transmission range are discussed in more 
detail. Also, compared with work in [8], we 
provide analysis for larger attack 
probabilities attaining better results than 
those that they report. 
 
Results have demonstrated the accuracy of 
the algorithm under severe interference and 
outage conditions imposed by the NNN 
interference and by the outage relaying route 
models. Even more, it has been demonstrated 
that the PO and the %SRP are improved as 
the node density and transmission range are 
increased without compromising the accuracy 
capabilities of the DDM. This is a desirable 
behavior for large and dense networks. 
 
 
 
 
                                  
b)  a) 
Figure 8. a) %NAR vs.
max a p , μ=50. b) %NAR vs.
max a p , μ=300.  
 
Note, that simulations for μ=300 nodes, r=30m and 35m where performed for all the 
 network parameters and behavior resulted similar to that presented for r=25m,  
for that reason those results are not included.  
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